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The US Army has defined its mission as a power projection force that conducts sustained, land combat through the following five elements: dominant maneuver, precision strikes, protect the force, win the information war and project and sustain combat power. The emerging revolution in the accuracy of firepower and the requirement to win future wars quickly, decisively and with minimal friendly casualties, is challenging this balanced approach. 2 Today, some proponents argue that precision strike has ushered in the ascendancy of fires, a new paradigm for ground combat that will transformed the role of precision strikes into the decisive element of land combat power." 3 The US Army has historically overwhelmed its enemies "with sheer weight of firepower." 4 The new precision strike technologies promise to destroy the enemy throughout the breadth and depth of the battle area with long range fires and appear to be a high-tech extrapolation of this old method. High-tech distant punishment promises to minimize the exposure of friendly forces and win the battle without the requirement to physically dominating the enemy. "The fundamental tenet of the construct is that we not expose our forces to enemy fires any more than we have to." 5 Proponents of this construct believe that precision strike has created a condition of Interchangeablllty, where firepower can substitute for maneuver on the modern battlefield. 6 In essence, precision strike advocates predict the end of maneuver.
Will precision strike systems obviate maneuver?
This is an important question that will decide the future shape of America's military. The battlefield dynamic of simultaneous attack throughout the depth of the battlefield hinges on detection of enemy location, near-real time reporting of this information, and near-real time engagement by friendly weapons. To make this concept work we will have to grid the battlefield, know the location of every target,' potential target and point of interest. Can we afford the cost of an army dominated by a doctrine devoted to precision strike?
If Force XXI is a "forcing function," designed to make the US Army figure out how to design, train and fight a future force, then we need to understand what happens to armies whose doctrine did not balance the elements of combat power. The quintessential example of the value of doctrine and the lure of the promise of the ascendancy of fires is the story of the French Army of 1940.
France 1940
Firepower dominated the battlefields of the WW1, slaughtering an entire generation in the blood-soaked trenches.
After the war, reducing casualties became a prime directive for the French military. As a result, the French Army "devoted considerable effort to create the best possible and most modern doctrine. It organized a complex and sophisticated system for considering new ideas and new technologies." The artillery set the tempo and rhythm of the attack and detailed preparation and synchronization was emphasized. The system required that plans leave nothing to chance -let alone human error -and the standard of discipline, therefore became rigid.
To avoid fratricide in a firepower intensive environment everyone had to act according to a detailed, well-rehearsed plan. The French "gridded" the battle area in front of their guns and accepted as certainty the mathematics of destruction. "The attack is the fire that advances, the defense is the fire that halts the enemy" became the motto of the French Army. General Erich von Manstein's words: "The aim of the offensive must be to achieve decisive results." 14 In this effort German doctrine played a decisive role:
"German doctrine, in short, emphasized the advantages of one continuous battle, ultimately leading to the complete rupture of the hostile defenses and the defeat of the enemy, while French doctrine accepted the possibility of a successive series of methodical battles. The Germans believed this continuous battle enabled them to retain the initiative and to achieve victory. And this belief existed long before German panzer forces or the blitzkrieg were created." 15 The story of the Battle for France in 1940 is well known.
The German attack through the weakly defended Ardennes forest, however, was not a simple drive through the woods by German The second lesson is that the ability to use the available technology effectively is more important than the technology itself. The Germans had a high degree of congixience between their weapons and their method of fighting. 20 Their doctrine aided this congruence and was an essential element of victory. A vivid example of congruence is the use of the radio as an information system. Every German tank had a radio. The requirement for radios was demanded by a doctrine that emphasized maneuver and combined arms. Few French tanks had radios, as they were not as necessary to fight precise, pre-planned, methodical battles. 21 French agility was as severely hampered by the mindset that doctrine imposed as due to their lack of informational systems.
"... the vital role that radio played in the technique of the blitzkrieg . . . was entirely due to the way in which German commanders were prepared to change plans minute by minute in the face of enemy opposition. It is extremely doubtful if such radio contact would have made much difference to the French or the British Army, which had trained to fight in setpiece battles." 
Conclusion
The ability to win bloodless victories through firepower alone is a siren's call -an idea with the best intentions that has, historically, produced bad results. War is a complex event and combat solutions are rarely, purely technological. The ascendancy of fires and the dominance of precision strike in US Army doctrine is a dangerous case in point.
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The aim of our future land power strategy should be the rapid and simultaneous dislocation of the enemy, not his total destruction. Victory through precision strike is too costly and General Dennis Reimer put it this way:
"For the Nation to be decisive in war, our enemies must be presented with complex military problems beyond their ability to solve. We must maintain an adequate balance between our capabilities to assure that adversaries cannot and will not solve the military puzzle that we pose. Precision strike is important but it isn't adequate. Balance between precision strike and dominant maneuver is required." is to produce the correct balance of firepower, mobility and protection to create a force that can apply decisive action.
Decisive action in the 21st Century will require precision strike and the ability to able achieve dominant maneuver on the battlefield. Our doctrine, training and procurement must reflect a balance where precision guided munitions provide maneuver a greater freedom of movement. Contrary to the wishes of many, the close fight may not disappear from future battlefields. With this in mind, dominant combined arms maneuver, enabled by precision strike, still offers the greatest probability for decisive action in the 21st Century. it tore open the enemy's front, penetrated deeply behind it, paralyzed opposition, and led to a battle of annihilation. Suddenness, violence, blitzkrieg schnell -these were the very nuclei of blitzkrieg. But there was something more. Once this violent all-destroying thrust had got going, it must never stop until the battle is won. If it halted it would be found, checked and attacked. To maintain momentum, night and day, was everything. The forces engaged must penetrate ever deeper, ever broader, and so bring about the absolute disruption of enemy positions, reserves, headquarters and supplies. The key to it was a never-ending flow of mixed panzer groups constantly supported and supplied by fire power and transport aircraft of the Luftwaffe. Thus the two indispensable agents of blitzkrieg were still Panzer.and Stuka. Nor should it be forgotten that each was helpless without fuel." p. 
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